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If The Mask Fits: The
Unconstitutionality of Face Masks
in Criminal Trials During
COVID-19 *
I. INTRODUCTION
Society, and certainly the courts, did not have time to prepare and
adapt to the unprecedented COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic before the
effects of the pandemic swept through the nation. The first coronavirus
case within the United States was reported on January 20, 2020. 1 The
coronavirus spread at an alarming rate, and by March 11, 2020, the
World Health Organization (WHO) declared the coronavirus a
pandemic. 2 Just two days later, the President of the United States,
Donald Trump, declared a National Emergency. 3 By January 10, 2021,
the United States faced 21,761,186 cumulative cases and 365,886 total
deaths from the coronavirus. 4
In the wake of the rapidly spreading virus, stay-at-home and shelterin-place orders went into effect in the majority of states by late March
* Professor Fleissner, thank you for your invaluable wisdom, time, and guidance.
Jonathan Perry Waters, Esquire, thank you for inspiring me to write about this topic and
your continued enthusiasm. Lindsey Daugherty and Geoffrey Morrison, my family, thank
you for your unwavering support and encouragement.
1 Michelle L. Holshue, M.P.H., et. al., First Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus in the United
NEW
ENGLAND
JOURNAL
OF
MEDICINE,
States,
THE
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2001191 (last visited Jan. 1, 2021).
2 AJMC Staff, A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AJMC,
https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020 (last visited Jan.
1, 2021).
3 Donald J. Trump, Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the
WHITE
HOUSE,
Novel
Coronavirus
Disease
(COVID-19)
Outbreak,
THE
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-nationalemergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/ (last visited Jan. 1,
2021).
4 United States of America Situation, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
https://covid19.who.int/region/amro/country/us (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
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2020. 5 By the end of March, the vast majority of state supreme courts
announced judicial emergencies, closed their doors, postponed
proceedings, or limited court activity to various degrees. 6 The Supreme
Court of Georgia issued an Order Declaring Statewide Judicial
Emergency 7 on March 14, 2020, which has been extended ten times with
various amendments and is still in effect as of January 10, 2021. 8 In
addition, various courts across the nation individually issued “orders
relating to court business, operating status, and public and employee
safety” in the months following the coronavirus outbreak. 9 Specifically,
all of Georgia’s United States District Courts 10 entered various orders
implementing new procedures in response to the coronavirus, including
suspending court proceedings and enforcing new health and safety
protocols. 11 Beginning in March 2020, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit introduced live-streaming for oral arguments,

5 Sarah Mervosh, et. al., See Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at
Home, THE NEW YORK TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirusstay-at-home-order.html (archived as of Apr. 20, 2020).
6 State court closures in response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic between
March
and
November,
2020,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/State_court_closures_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID19)_pandemic,_2020 (archived as of Nov. 4, 2020).
7 Chief Justice Harold D. Melton, Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency,
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CJMelton-amended-Statewide-Jud-Emergency-order.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2021).
8 Court Information Regarding The Coronavirus, SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA,
https://www.gasupreme.us/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
9 Judiciary Preparedness for Coronavirus (COVID-19), UNITED STATES COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/03/12/judiciary-preparedness-coronavirus-covid-19
(archived as of June 3, 2020). The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia’s courthouse in Rome, Georgia, was one of the first district courts to close their
courthouse in the nation after an employee contracted symptoms of the coronavirus on
March 18, 2020. Id.
10
Courts
in
Georgia,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Courts_in_Georgia#Federal_district_courts (last visited Jan. 10,
2021).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, and the United States District
Court for the Southern District Court of Georgia are the three federal district courts in
Georgia.
11 Time Periods in General Order 20-01 Further Extended Through January 3, 2021,
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
NORTHERN
DISTRICT
OF
GEORGIA,
UNITED
http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/news/time-periods-general-order-20-01-further-extendedthrough-january-3-2021 (last visited Jan. 10, 2021); COVID 19: Public Health and Safety,
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
MIDDLE
DISTRICT
OF
GEORGIA,
UNITED
https://www.gamd.uscourts.gov/news/covid-19-public-health-and-safety (last visited Jan.
10, 2021); COVID-19, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGIA, https://www.gasd.uscourts.gov/covid-19 (last visited Jan 10, 2021).
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limited access to the courthouse, and suspended paper filing
requirements. 12 The Supreme Court of the United States closed to the
public indefinitely beginning March 12, 2020, while also postponing oral
arguments for March and April 2020. 13
With courts at all levels in stalemate for months, many courts have
implemented creative and untraditional court procedures to allow cases
to move forward during the coronavirus pandemic. While some courts are
allowing for alternatives to in-person court appearances by remote
videoconferencing, 14 many courts are beginning to reopen with the
condition that those in the courtroom wear masks and keep space
between each other. 15 It is becoming common practice for courts to
implement new safety and health measures to prevent the spread of the
coronavirus while allowing cases to continue in-person. 16
Naturally, a shock has hit the judicial system. Courtrooms across the
nation are rapidly transitioning to ensure all occupants are distanced and
all parties are wearing face coverings. The fear of spreading the
coronavirus is on everyone’s minds. In such unprecedented times,
necessary protections such as masks seem essential. Nonetheless, hiding
a witness’s face behind a mask raises serious questions: What about
tradition? What about precedent? What about the Constitution? The
right to face an accuser at trial is a hallmark of the American justice

12 Chief Judge Ed Carnes, GENERAL ORDER NO. 45 Oral Arguments By Audio or
Teleconferencing, IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/GeneralOrder45.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2021); Chief Judge Ed Carnes, GENERAL ORDER NO. 44
RESTRICTIONS ON VISITORS TO THE COURT AND TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
PAPER FILING REQUIREMENTS, IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/GeneralOrder44.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2021).
13 Tucker Higgins, Supreme Court postpones arguments because of coronavirus, citing
Spanish flu precedent, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/16/supreme-court-postponesarguments-over-coronavirus.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
14 William M. Droze & Ashley Cameron, Litigating in the Age of COVID-19, TROUTMAN
PEPPER, https://www.troutman.com/insights/litigating-in-the-age-of-covid-19.html (last
visited Jan. 10, 2021).
15 As Courts Restore Operations, COVID-19 Creates a New Normal, UNITED STATES
COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/08/20/courts-restore-operations-covid-19creates-new-normal (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
16 Id. “For more than 230 years, the federal Judiciary has spanned the horseback era
to the internet age, but in one key aspect it has never changed. Just as in the nation’s
earliest years, the Constitution still requires federal courts to conduct many critical legal
proceedings in person.” Id.
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system. 17 The very foundation and traditions of our court system are
being questioned and pushed.
As new, untraditional, and unprecedented court procedures are
implemented, courts at all levels must tread lightly when making
changes to the criminal trial process. The Bill of Rights includes the allimportant Sixth Amendment, 18 which aims to protect the rights of a
criminal defendant while defending his liberties during trial. As criminal
proceedings are resuming in-person and with masks, every American
court should concern itself with serious violations of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause, which provides that “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him . . . .” 19 A crucial issue beginning to emerge for
all courts across the nation is whether confronting a witness whose face
is covered with a mask is a violation of the Constitution under the
Confrontation Clause. 20 United States Supreme Court precedent
regarding the importance of and requirements of the Confrontation
Clause, as well as lower court decisions regarding facial disguises during
criminal trials, provide some guidance. Nonetheless, there is no
conclusive answer to the newfound requirement of wearing masks.
Though no conclusive answer has specifically been provided on the
constitutionality of wearing masks during criminal trials, this Comment
will show that the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 21 solidified
the criminal defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him faceto-face and limited the possibility for exceptions to this right. The
Crawford decision established that judges should not be permitted to
make subjective judgments overriding the Constitutional protections of
criminal defendants, leaving little room for courts to make changes to the
right to face-to-face confrontation, even in such instances as a global
pandemic.
This Comment takes the position that having witnesses in criminal
trials wear face masks violates the Confrontation Clause. The recent
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court,
specifically in Crawford, makes clear the Sixth Amendment requires
face-to-face confrontation in the most literal sense, which cannot be
dispensed with at the discretion of judges. Part I provides an introduction
to the novel coronavirus and sets the framework for a discussion of the
17 Id.
18 U.S. Const. amend VI.
19 Id.
20 See United States v. Crittenden, No. 420-CR-7 (CDL), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151950
(M.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2020).
21 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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unconstitutionality of face masks during criminal trials. Part II looks at
the history of the Confrontation Clause, specifically the right to face-toface confrontation; precedent set by the Supreme Court answering
Confrontation Clause questions; and various federal circuit and state
court approaches to face coverings under the Confrontation Clause. Part
III analyzes an order from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia that addresses the constitutionality of face masks at
criminal trials during the global pandemic. Part IV addresses the
appropriate Supreme Court test, the Crawford test, which supports the
determination that masks are unconstitutional during criminal trials;
the potential impacts on criminal defendants if mask-wearing witnesses
are permitted to testify; and the potential remedies to ensure the health
and safety of participants without using face masks.
II. HISTORY
A. Origin of Face-to-Face Confrontation
The concept behind the Confrontation Clause and the right to face-toface confrontation goes back long before the drafting of the Constitution
“with lineage that traces back to the beginnings of Western legal
culture.” 22 The Supreme Court has stated, and shown respect for, the fact
that the right to face-to-face confrontation comes from deep historical
roots, dating back as far as Roman Law. 23 The Roman Governor Festus,
between the years 80 and 90, was quoted stating: “It is not the manner
of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met
his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself
against the chargers.” 24
Centuries later, Sir Walter Raleigh's infamous trial in England in
1603 raised questions as to the right of an accused to confront the witness
against him. 25 After allegations of treason, Raleigh “demanded that the
judges call [the witness] to appear, arguing that ‘the Proof of the Common
Law is by witness and jury: let [the witness] be here, let him speak it.
Call my accuser before my face . . . .’” 26 Raleigh’s demand was denied, and
he was sentenced to death. 27 After cries of injustice, English statutory
and judiciary reform took place, developing the common law right to

22 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988).
23 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43; Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015.
24 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015–16 (quoting Acts of the Apostles 25:16).
25 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
26 Id. (quoting 2 How. St. Tr., at 15–16 (1603)).
27 Id.
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confrontation and specifically requiring witnesses to confront the accused
face-to-face. 28
In the United States, by the time of the Declaration of Independence,
many states had individually adopted the right to confrontation. 29 The
drafters of the Constitution of the United States of America, however, did
not originally include the right to confrontation in the Constitution. 30 In
response to this omission, Abraham Holmes at the Massachusetts
ratifying convention expressed concern that “whether [the defendant] is
to be allowed to confront the witnesses and have the advantage of crossexamination, we are not yet told . . . .” 31 In addition, a well-known
Antifederalist, the “Federal Farmer,” wrote “Nothing can be more
essential than the cross examining [of] witnesses, and generally before
the triers of the facts in question . . . .” 32 Following these public concerns,
the First Congress in 1789 passed and proposed for ratification the
Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment. 33
The right to face-to-face confrontation in criminal trials has since
remained a longstanding tradition in the United States. The reason faceto-face confrontation has persisted throughout centuries is based on the
“profound effect” of a witness facing the person the witness is accusing. 34
There “is something deep in human nature” which makes it essential to
have a face-to-face meeting during a criminal trial; the right to
confrontation is “essential to fairness.” 35 Furthermore, inherent in
human nature is that “[i]t is always more difficult to tell a lie about a
person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his back.’” 36 When forced to face the man
he accuses, the witness’s “demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony [shows] whether he is worthy of belief.” 37
To force the witness to look upon the defendant, the witness “may feel
quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom
he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts. He can now
understand what sort of human being that man is.” 38 As President
Eisenhower profoundly stated, “In this country, if someone dislikes you,

28 Id.
29 Id. at 48.
30 Id.
31 Id. (quoting 2 Debates on the Federal Constitution 110–111, J. Elliot 2d ed. 1863).
32 Id. at 49 (quoting R. Lee, Letter IV by the Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1787)).
33 Id. at 49.
34 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
35 Id. at 1017–19.
36 Id. at 1019.
37 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895).
38 Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 375–76 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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or accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the
shadow.” 39 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has always upheld the
notion that the Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant
the right to meet face-to-face the witnesses against him. 40
B. Supreme Court Precedent: The Confrontation Clause
With that said, the Supreme Court has not held the right to face-toface confrontation is an absolute right and has, at times, dispensed with
a defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation. Although there is
substantial precedent upholding the importance of face-to-face
confrontation, precedent on whether and when it is permissible to admit
testimony that is not face-to-face is contradictory.
1. Coy: Face-to-Face Confrontation and the Placement of
a Screen
In Coy v. Iowa, 41 the Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental
importance of a defendant’s right to confrontation when holding
unconstitutional the placement of a screen between the defendant and
witnesses during trial testimony. 42 In Coy, the two witnesses, two 13year-old girls, alleged that the defendant had sexually assaulted them.
That same year, the state of Iowa enacted a statute that allowed
witnesses, by motion, to testify behind a screen during criminal trials.
The State made a motion for the use of the screen between the testifying
witnesses and the defendant, a motion which the defendant strenuously
objected to, arguing the screen violated his confrontation rights. 43 The
State argued that the use of the screen was necessary based on Iowa’s
statutory presumption that child victims will be traumatized testifying
before an alleged defendant. 44 The trial court allowed the use of the “large
screen” to be placed between the defendant and the two witnesses while
the two alleged victims testified. 45 The screen itself only allowed the
defendant to “dimly . . . perceive the witnesses, but the witnesses to see
him not at all.” 46

39 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017–18.
40 Id. at 1016.
41 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
42 Id. at 1022.
43 Id. at 1014–15.
44 Id. at 1021.
45 Id. at 1014.
46 Id. at 1015.
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The Supreme Court in Coy held the use of a screen to block the
witnesses from view while on the witness stand was unconstitutional. 47
The Court in Coy supported its decision by holding the language of the
Confrontation Clause “[s]imply as a matter of Latin” and “‘[s]imply as a
matter of English,’ [] confers at least ‘a right to meet face to face all those
who appear and give evidence at trial.’” 48 Hence, based on the clear
language of the clause, the Supreme Court has never before doubted the
Confrontation Clause guarantees the right to a face-to-face meeting
between the witness and defendant. 49
In response to the State’s argument that the victims will
presumptively be traumatized having to face their accuser, the Court
recognized the truthful victim may, unfortunately, become upset while in
the face-to-face presence of the defendant. 50 However, despite the fact
that confronting the defendant to his face may upset the witness, the
defendant has a constitutional right to this confrontation. 51 Alas, “[i]t is
a truism that constitutional protections have costs.” 52 The constitutional
right of face-to-face confrontation has a profound purpose “[t]he State can
hardly gainsay . . . .” 53 Specifically, face-to-face confrontation may
establish the alleged trauma of the witness, or it may undo a false accuser
or reveal a coached child. 54 Therefore, the Court in Coy held the
defendant’s right to confrontation must prevail and allow for face-to-face
confrontation and omit testimony while hidden behind a screen. 55
The Court does, however, go further to hold that despite its decision,
the rights conferred in the Confrontation Clause are not absolute rights,
and exceptions have been created by the Supreme Court. 56 Looking to
precedent, all previous exceptions to confrontation, however, were
permitted in cases where the rights at issue were implied rights found in
the Confrontation Clause, 57 not those rights “narrowly and explicitly set
47 Id. at 1022.
48 Id. at 1016 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970)).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1020.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1022.
56 Id. at 1020.
57 Id. The Supreme Court held the implied rights in the Confrontation Clause that are
reasonably susceptible to sway by important interests are: 1) the right to cross-examine; 2)
the right to exclude statements made out-of-court; and 3) the right to face-to-face
confrontation during the proceedings but not at the actual trial. Id. These implied rights in
the Confrontation Clause must make take into consideration and give way to reasonably
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forth in the Clause.” 58 Essentially, the Court has not previously created
or permitted exceptions to “the irreducible literal meaning of the Clause:
‘a right to meet face to face . . . .’” 59 The Coy Court declined to find any
exceptions to face-to-face confrontation in the case before the Court, but
allows for the possibility. 60 The Court held any possible exceptions to the
right to face-to-face confrontation “would surely be allowed only when
necessary to further an important public policy.” 61 Although no exception
to face-to-face confrontation was provided by the Court, the Coy Court
still provided guidance on what is sufficient to create an exception to this
right. Any exception would need to be “something more than [a] type of
generalized finding” and must be based on “individualized findings” to
create a “conceivable exception.” 62 An argument based on the
presumptive findings of a general statute is insufficiently individualized
to the case to create an exception. 63
2. Craig: Reliability and Public Policy
Just two years after the decision in Coy, the Court in Maryland v.
Craig, 64 held constitutional the testimony of a witness who did not testify
face-to-face with the defendant. 65 In Craig, the defendant was accused of
various crimes, including child abuse. The State motioned for a statutory
procedure that permits an alleged victim of child abuse to testify via oneway video stream. To permit the procedure, the trial judge had to make
an individualized finding that the child will experience such emotional
distress that the child will be unable to reasonably communicate while
testifying in the courtroom. The defendant objected to the use of the
procedure based on her rights under the Confrontation Clause. 66 The
trial judge, however, found, although face-to-face confrontation is denied
under the statutory procedure, the “essence of the right of confrontation”
remains because the defendant and jury can still observe the witness,
and the defendant’s counsel can still cross-examine the witness. 67
important interests. Id. However, the Court had not previously held that the rights
expressly stated in the Confrontation Clause, like the right to meet face-to-face, can give
way to other important interests. Id. at 1021.
58 Id. at 1020.
59 Id. at 1021 (quoting California, 399 U.S. at 175).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
65 Id. at 846.
66 Id. at 840–42.
67 Id.
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Thereafter, the trial court found the evidence—including the testimony
of an expert witness—was sufficient to invoke the procedure and allowed
the child victim to testify over a one-way video circuit. Under the
procedure, the child was cross-examined in a separate room while a video
monitor displayed the testimony in the courtroom for the defendant, jury,
and judge to view. The defendant only saw the witness over television
streaming, and the witness never saw the defendant at all. 68
Because the trial court denied face-to-face confrontation based on
individualized findings consistent with Coy, 69 it “require[d] [the Supreme
Court] to decide the question reserved in Coy,” specifically, whether an
exception exists to face-to-face confrontation. 70 To answer this question,
the Craig Court held the “central concern of the Confrontation Clause is
to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant.” 71
Reliability under the Confrontation Clause is not just based on face-toface confrontation, but “[t]he combined effect of these elements of
confrontation—physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and
observation of the demeanor by the trier of fact—serves the purpose of
the Confrontation Clause . . . .” 72 Therefore, the right to face-to-face
confrontation is not the “sin qua non” 73 of the defendant’s right to
confrontation, and the confrontation rights of a defendant must be
interpreted in light of the necessities of the trial and other reliability
elements. 74 The right to face-to-face confrontation, according to the Craig
Court, is simply a “preference.” 75
After finding face-to-face confrontation is not required in every
instance of testimony against a defendant, the Craig Court turned to the
Coy Court’s requirement that, to create an exception to face-to-face
confrontation, there must be a necessary public policy interest to
further. 76 Only “occasionally” does the preference for face-to-face

68 Id. at 841–43.
69 Id. at 845. The Court in Coy held for an exception to exist to face-to-face confrontation,
a court must make an individualized finding of necessity for some important public policy
reason. Coy, 487 U.S at 1021.
70 Craig, 497 U.S. at 845.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 846.
73 Id. Black’s Law Dictionary defines sine qua non as “An indispensable condition or
thing; something on which something else necessarily depends.” Sine qua non Definition,
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
74 Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.
75 Id. at 849 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
76 Id. at 850.
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confrontation give way to public policy. 77 The public policy exception
must be necessary in light of the case before the court. 78
Applying the reliability test and public policy inquiry to the case in
Craig, the Court held the testimony was still reliable because the witness
was placed under oath, cross-examined, and observed by the trier of
fact—although through a video stream. 79 Next, the State’s specific policy
interest in protecting the child witness from seeing her alleged accuser
after expert testimony found the witness would suffer “serious emotional
distress” outweighed the defendant’s right to face her accuser. 80 The
Court also reaffirmed that in every case where the defendant’s right to
face-to-face confrontation is hindered, the court must provide a casespecific finding of necessity. 81 Therefore, to find an exception to face-toface confrontation under Craig, courts should focus on the reliability of
evidence and the public policy interest in preventing a face-to-face
meeting in each case. 82
3. Crawford: Rejecting Reliability Tests
Over a decade after the decision in Craig, the Supreme Court in
Crawford v. Washington, 83 again analyzed the right of a criminal
defendant under the Confrontation Clause, but this time in the context
of a hearsay exception. 84 Although not directly dealing with in-person
trial testimony, the Court in Crawford took the opportunity to make
broad holdings about the importance of a defendant’s right to
confrontation. 85 Most notably, the Court held the Sixth Amendment does
not provide for “open-ended exceptions from the confrontation
requirement to be developed by the courts[,]” including exceptions
created based on the reliability of testimony. 86
The Crawford Court specifically focused on a prior Supreme Court
decision, Ohio v. Roberts, 87 which did not align with the original meaning
of the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by the Founders and as

77 Id. at 849.
78 Id. at 850.
79 Id. at 851–52.
80 Id. at 842–55.
81 Id. at 857–58.
82 Id. at 850.
83 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
84 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
85 Id. at 54.
86 Id.
87 448 U.S. 56 ( 1980).
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established in century-old precedent. 88 In Roberts, the Supreme Court
held that the admission of out-of-court testimony required a judicial
determination of whether the testimony falls under a hearsay exception
or has an “indicia of reliability.” 89 The Roberts test, therefore, allowed
courts to admit or deny testimony based on reliability. 90 The Crawford
Court held, under the Sixth Amendment, this “[d]ispensing with
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This
is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.” 91 Based on the Framers’
intentions when drafting the Sixth Amendment, the Crawford Court held
there is no reliability exception regarding the right of confrontation, and
only those exceptions that still meet the intent of the Framers are
permissible. 92
The Crawford Court took issue with and overturned the Roberts
reliability test for two crucial reasons. 93 First, the Roberts test allowed
judges to consider and weigh reliability elements, which could easily lead
to different results based on the judge overseeing the trial, causing
unpredictability. 94 Second, and most importantly, the Roberts test
allowed for the admission of testimony the Confrontation Clause should

88 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243; Motes v. United States, 176
U.S. 458 (1900).
89 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
90 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 54–61. The intentions of the Framers can be traced to precedent set by the
Supreme Court as far back as 1895. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54–58; see Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). The Court in Mattox, premising its decision on the law existing
at the time of the Constitution, held a defendant must have the opportunity to crossexamine a witness prior to trial to admit out-of-court testimony. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57;
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242. The right of confrontation is meant to preserve the right of faceto-face testimony and to subject the witness “to the ordeal of cross-examination.” Mattox,
156 U.S. at 244. Just five years later in 1900, the Supreme Court also stood for the
proposition that out-of-court testimony which fails to prove the unavailability of a witness
should be excluded. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57; Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 473–
74 (1900). In Motes, the prosecution submitted a statement by a witness that was available
for cross-examination by the defendants previously but did not present the witness at trial,
failing to prove unavailability. Motes, 178 U.S. at 470–71. Therefore, based on Mattox and
Motes, the intent of the Framers was to ensure the right to cross-examination and in-person
testimony except when the witness is unavailable.
93 The Court in Crawford did not clearly express its decision to overrule Roberts.
However, in a subsequent Supreme Court case, the Court confirmed its intention in
Crawford was to overturn Roberts when expressly holding “our opinion in
Crawford . . . overruled Roberts.” Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 413 (2007).
94 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
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exclude simply because the testimony is “reliable.” 95 Therefore, the Court
in Crawford held weighing reliability factors at the discretion of judges
“reveals a fundamental failure on our part to interpret the Constitution
in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion.” 96 The
Court in Crawford ruled against judicial discretion under the
Confrontation Clause and dispensed with the Roberts reliability test. 97
However, the Crawford Court did not address the Craig reliability
test. Although Craig focused on in-person testimony, not hearsay as in
Crawford, the Crawford Court generally held against judges using their
discretion to create exceptions to a defendant’s very constitutional rights
under the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, trying to reconcile Craig and
Crawford poses serious questions about the level of discretion judges
have to create exceptions to the right to confrontation, both when
balancing reliability elements and when inquiring into public policy.
C. Circuit Court Cases & State Court Cases: Facial Coverings and
Disguises
Recent circuit court and state court cases have specifically dealt with
witnesses covering all or some of their faces while on the witness stand.
These cases shed light on how jurisdictions have interpreted Supreme
Court precedent on the Confrontation Clause. Most notably, the cases’
interpretations highlight the inconsistent results that circuit courts and
state courts have reached about what Supreme Court case and test to
apply in facial disguise cases.
1. The Second Circuit in Morales
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Morales v. Artuz, 98
analyzed the right to face-to-face confrontation in a case where the
witness testified while wearing dark sunglasses. 99 The witness was at
the trial to give eye-witness testimony after claiming to have seen the
defendant shoot the victim; the State’s case strongly rested on this eyewitness testimony. The witness testified at the first trial wearing
sunglasses. The first trial, however, resulted in a hung jury, and, during

95 Id.
96 Id. at 67.
97 Id. 68–69. The Supreme Court has continued to support its holdings in Crawford in
post-Crawford cases which specifically reject the use of a reliability test to create
Confrontation Clause exceptions. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 317–
18, (2009).
98 281 F.3d 55 (2nd Cir. 2002).
99 Id. at 56.
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the second trial, the witness wished to wear sunglasses again while
testifying. 100
At the second trial, the defense counsel objected to the witness wearing
sunglasses, and the trial judge sustained the objection. 101 The trial judge
found that the witness shielding her face with dark sunglasses prevented
anyone in the courtroom from seeing through them, which “d[id] not
provide the defendant with adequate opportunity to examine [the
witness] and it d[id] not provide the jurors with the opportunity to
evaluate [the witness’s] credibility.” 102 The witness nonetheless refused
to take the sunglasses off, even upon the judge’s order that she remove
them. 103 Eventually, the trial judge relented and allowed the witness to
wear the sunglasses based on the necessity of the witness’s testimony,
but recognized the dark sunglasses “‘partially’ [infringed] the defendant’s
right to confrontation.” 104
The Second Circuit, in reviewing the case, recognized the right to
confrontation is clearly established by the Supreme Court, but when the
witness is minimally disguised, Supreme Court precedent is less clear. 105
Both Craig and Coy provided a test for admissibility when the witness
was in some way physically separated from the defendant, but these
cases did not provide an appropriate test when dealing with a “slight
disguise . . . . Indeed, the Court has not considered any case involving a
disguise that obscures the normal opportunity to observe all aspects of a
witness’s demeanor.” 106 Even when turning to precedent for the virtues
of the Confrontation Clause, 107 there seems to be contradictory values the
Court has emphasized, preventing the Morales court from basing its

100 Id. at 56–57
101 Id. at 57.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 58.
106 Id. at 58–59. Morales was decided before the Crawford decision. However, because
Crawford did not directly deal with visual obstructions of the witness, the Crawford
decision unlikely would have drastically changed the decision in Morales. If anything,
Crawford would have led to more confusion as the Crawford Court introduced another
Confrontation Clause holding which varies from other Supreme Court precedent, an
inconsistency in precedent the Morales court already noted. Id.
107 Morales, 281 F.3d at 59. The Morales court cites various, seemingly conflicting
Supreme Court decisions regarding the central value of face-to-face confrontation. (see
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678
(1986)).
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decision on the importance—or insignificance—of the visibility of the
witness’s eyes during testimony. 108
Turning to the facts, the Morales court held, to the extent the Supreme
Court has established the right of the defendant to see the witness, “some
impairment occurred.” 109 However, besides the inability to see the
witness’s eyes, the witness’s full body was in view of the defendant and
the trier of fact, allowing them to observe the witness’s body language
and to assess the delivery and credibility of her testimony. 110 The court
in Morales determined all other bases for evaluating the witness’s
testimony were still in place; “[a]ll that was lacking was the jury’s ability
to discern whatever might have been indicated by the movement of her
eyes.” 111 Based on this finding, the Morales court determined that
allowing the witness to wear sunglasses was permissible. 112 Notably, the
court did not make any conclusive holdings on the defendant’s right to
confrontation when the witness is disguised, only doubting that the
sunglass disguise violated the constitutional protections of the defendant
under the Confrontation Clause, deferring to the lower court’s
application of the law. 113
2. The Ninth Circuit in Jesus-Casteneda
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. De
Jesus-Casteneda, 114 addressed the constitutionality of a witness wearing
a disguise under the Sixth Amendment. 115 The State asked that the
witness be permitted to wear a fake mustache and wig during testimony
because the witness was a confidential informant. The witness claimed

is:

108 Morales, 281 F.3d at 59. Depending on what the value of face-to-face confrontation

[t]o the extent that the Supreme Court’s ‘established law’ of confrontation seeks
to assure cross-examination and an opportunity for the witness to the see the
defendant, [the witness’s] sunglasses created no impairment. On the other hand,
to the extent that the right assures an opportunity for the defendant and
especially the jurors to see the witness’s eyes in order to consider her demeanor
as an aid to assessing her credibility, some impairment occurred. Id. at 60.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 61–62.
111 Id. at 62. “[The jurors] had a full opportunity to combine these fully observable
aspects of demeanor with their consideration of the substance of her testimony, assessing
her opportunity to observe, the consistency of her account, any hostile motive, and all the
other traditional bases for evaluating testimony.” Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. The Morales court deferred to the finding of the state court to permit the
testimony and held the, “the state court did not make an unreasonable application of such
law[]” when permitting testimony of the sunglass-wearing witness. Id.
114 705 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2013).
115 Id. at 1119.
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the purpose of the disguise was to protect his identity due to the
particular dangers of his involvement in the Sinaloa Cartel’s drug
trafficking ring. Defense counsel objected because the witness’s disguise
concealed his facial expressions, hindering the defendant and jury’s
ability to analyze the witness’s demeanor and credibility. The trial court
nonetheless found the witness could testify in disguise. 116 Based on the
risks to the witness, the trial judge decided “the disguise was a ‘very
small impingement . . . on the ability . . . to judge . . . credibility.’” 117 The
defendant appealed, contending the disguise violated his rights under the
Confrontation Clause. 118
As in Morales, the court in Jesus-Casteneda held there is no “Supreme
Court authority addressing whether a witness’s testimony in disguise
violates the Confrontation Clause.” 119 Instead, the Jesus-Casteneda court
turned to analogous cases in other jurisdictions for guidance. 120 Focusing
on a similar case in Texas which addressed facial disguises under the
Confrontation Clause, 121 the Jesus-Casteneda court utilized the Craig
test to determine whether the witness’s facial disguise violated the
defendant’s confrontation rights. 122 Namely, the court considered the
reliability elements 123 and considered whether there was an important
state interest when determining the constitutionality of the disguise
under the Confrontation Clause. 124
The Jesus-Casteneda court held the disguise was constitutional under
the Craig test because of the important state interest in protecting the
witness’s identity and safety. 125 Specifically, the witness was at
particular risk against retaliation and exposure from the Sinaloa
Cartel. 126 Furthermore, the court went on to determine all other elements
of reliability were met with the witness testifying under oath, with the
ability to cross-examine the witness by the defendant within the
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1120. Specifically, the court analyzed Romero v. State, 173 S.W.3d 502
(Tex.Crim.App.2005), which is addressed later in this Comment. Id.
122 Jesus-Casteneda, 705 F.3d at 1120.
123 Id. The court, in determining reliability, used the Craig test to consider the following
elements 1) physical presence of the witness; 2) the witness under oath; 3) the prior
opportunity to cross-examine the witness; 4) the right to observe the demeanor of the
witness by the jury. Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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defendant’s view, with the jury’s ability to see the demeanor of the
witness, and with the witness’s physical presence in the courtroom. 127
Based on the application of the Craig test, the court ruled the disguise
did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. 128
3. The Texas Court of Appeals in Romero
In Romero v. State, 129 a Court of Appeals of Texas decision, the court
held unconstitutional the testimony of a witness who wore a disguise of
sunglasses, a baseball cap, and a jacket with an upturned collar while
testifying. 130 The witness in the case refused even to enter the courtroom
without the disguise, explaining he feared the defendant would seek
revenge. The defendant’s counsel immediately objected to the disguise as
violating the defendant’s constitutional right to face his accuser. The trial
judge allowed the witness to testify in the disguise, and the defendant
appealed based on violations of his confrontation right. 131
In determining the appropriate test to apply to a facial disguise
case, 132 the Romero court reviewed both Coy and Craig. 133 In Craig, the
defendant and jury could all see the witness and analyze the defendant’s
demeanor, albeit over a television screen. 134 In Romero, however,
“neither the defendant nor the trier of fact was fully able to ‘look at [the
witness], and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he [gave] his testimony whether he [was] worthy of belief.’” 135 This
right to see the witness has many “subtle effects” on a criminal
proceeding. 136
In addition, the Romero court held the use of a disguise is similar to
the use of a screen between the witnesses and the defendant in Coy. 137
The Romero court, however, went further to hold the use of the disguise

127 Id. at 1121.
128 Id.
129 136 S.W.3d 680 (2004).
130 Id. at 690–91.
131 Id. at 682.
132 Id. The decision in Romero was decided just one month after the Crawford decision.
Id. at 681; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36. The Crawford decision was decided March 8, 2004,
while the Romero decision was decided April 27, 2004. Id.; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
Whether the Romero court knew of or considered Crawford is unknown based on the
appellate court decision.
133 Romero, 136 S.W.3d at 682–84.
134 Id. at 684 (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 851).
135 Id. at 685 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).
136 Id. (quoting Craig, 497 U.S. at 851).
137 Id. at 682–83 (citing Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014).
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was worse than the use of the screen in Coy. 138 The intent in Coy was to
hide the defendant from the witness; in contrast, the intent in the case
before the court in Romero was to hide the witness from the defendant. 139
This crucial dissimilarity did not allow the defendant to view the face of
the witness and violated the defendant’s confrontation rights. 140
The Romero court noted that in Craig, a policy interest may prevail
over face-to-face confrontation on an individual basis. 141 Romero,
however, held even if a discussion of policy at the trial level in the Romero
case had occurred, “we doubt that, under the circumstances, allowing an
adult witness to substantially conceal his or her face while testifying in
a criminal trial would pass constitutional muster.” 142 History and
precedent provide that the Confrontation Clause ensures the “literal
right” to meet face-to-face and is a core value of the Confrontation
Clause. 143 The court went even further to hold that the Second Circuit in
Morales, “downplayed” this right when allowing the witness to wear
sunglasses while testifying. 144 Although the witness may have had
justifiable reasons for covering his face in Romero, “constitutional
protections have costs.” 145 Therefore, the disguise violated the
defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. 146
4. The Court of Appeals of Michigan in Sammons
The Court of Appeals of Michigan in People v. Sammons, 147 held
unconstitutional the wearing of a full face mask while testifying under
the Confrontation Clause. 148 The State’s chief witness, an informant
involved in the sale of cocaine with the defendant, wore a mask that
covered his full face and head while testifying. 149 Not only did the witness
wear the mask during the entrapment hearing, 150 but the witness also
138 Id. at 683.
139 Id. (citing Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020).
140 Id. at 690–91.
141 Id. at 684. (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 855).
142 Id. at 687–88.
143 Id. at 688 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 157).
144 Id. (citing Morales, 291 F.3d at 62).
145 Id. at 689 (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020).
146 Id. at 691.
147 478 N.W.2d 901 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
148 Id. at 909.
149 Id. at 904.
150 Id. Although an entrapment hearing is not a criminal trial, the court in Sammons
held, because an entrapment hearing is an adversarial process, and because there is a
factual finding by the trier of fact, the defendant’s protections under the Confrontation
Clause apply to the entrapment hearing. Id. at 907.
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refused to reveal his identity. 151 The trial judge allowed the witness to
wear the disguise and also instructed the defense not to ask any
“identifying questions” of the witness. 152 The purpose of allowing such
protections of the witness was based on allegations that a codefendant
offered cocaine to a third-party to have the witness killed. The defendant
appealed on the grounds that he was unable to confront the accuser from
behind a mask, and the mask prevented the trier of fact from assessing
the witness’s credibility. 153
Considering both Craig and Coy, 154 the court in Sammons applied the
Craig test, focusing on the State’s interest in disguising and refusing to
identify the witness, as well as the reliability of the witness’s
testimony. 155 First, the court in Sammons held the State did have an
interest in the safety of the witness during a criminal proceeding;
however, protective measures for the witness must be tailored to best
“preserve the essence of effective confrontation . . . .” 156 In Sammons, the
use of a mask “foreclosed the opportunity for the trier of fact to
adequately assess the witness’ credibility through observation of
demeanor[,]” resulting in an ultimate failure to preserve this “essence” of
confrontation. 157
The ability to see the witness’s face was deemed crucial in observing
demeanor as “[t]he facial expressions of a witness may convey much more
to the trier of facts than do . . . spoken words.” 158 In addition, “a full-face
mask tends to diminish the aspect of personalization associated with
testifying about a defendant ‘to his face.’” 159 The court in Sammons,
therefore, held the mask “denied [the] defendant a critical aspect of his
confrontation rights[]” because the defendant could not see his accuser’s
face and the trier of fact was precluded from assessing the witness’s
demeanor while testifying. 160

151 Id. at 904.
152 Id. at 905.
153 Id. at 905–06.
154 Id. at 908.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 909–10.
158 Id. at 909 (citing United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1179 (5th Cir. 1985).
159 Id. at 908.
160 Id. at 909. The Sammons court also held refusing to disclose the identity of the
witness violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. By not identifying the witness, the defense
was precluded from cross-examining the witness based on any background information,
hindering the defense’s ability to test the credibility of the witness. Id.
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III. DISCUSSION: THE INTRODUCTION OF MANDATORY MASKS TO CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS IN A GEORGIA COURTROOM
Individual courts and judges have begun recognizing and addressing
potential Confrontation Clause violations resulting from changing court
procedures in response to the coronavirus. Of particular concern has been
the defendant’s confrontation rights when witnesses wear masks while
testifying during criminal trials. Although the novel coronavirus is only
months old, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia has already responded to concerns that witnesses testifying
while wearing masks is unconstitutional.
In the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
in United States v. Crittenden, 161 Judge Land, at least preliminarily, held
constitutional the requirement that witnesses wear face masks during
criminal testimony in the coronavirus era. 162 The court in Crittenden
considered the constitutionality of face masks in response to the
Government’s objection to the requirement that all witnesses wear face
masks during Aubrey Crittenden’s criminal trial. 163 The Government
raised concerns “that by requiring witnesses to wear a mask that covers
their nose and mouth during testimony, the Court may infringe upon the
Defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation of the witnesses against
him as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause . . . .” 164
Before responding to the constitutional question brought by the
Government, the Crittenden court first addressed the evolution of the
pandemic and the serious risks of spreading and contracting the
coronavirus. 165 The court in Crittenden explained the coronavirus is
believed to be spread through the respiratory tract—specifically through
bodily fluids from coughing or sneezing. 166 The virus is also believed to
stay on surfaces which, with subsequent contact with the respiratory
tract— such as a person touching a surface and then his face or nose—

161 United States v. Crittenden, No. 420-CR-7 (CDL), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151950
(M.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2020).
162 Id. at *26.
163 Id. at *1–*2.
164 Id. at *13. A Government motion arguing on behalf of the constitutional protections
of the defendant is unusual. Although the Order and motion by the Government does not
provide why the Government made the motion, it is most likely due to the fact the
Government is concerned about potential reversals of judgments if masks at criminal trials
are later deemed unconstitutional under the Confrontation Clause.
165 Id. at *2–*4.
166 Id. at *2.
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could spread the virus. 167 If a person contracts the coronavirus, the
individual may present with “respiratory distress, and it may cause
death,” especially amongst those with underlying health conditions. 168
The spread of the virus creates a unique concern for the court: the
health of all trial participants. Governments and businesses have been
forced to adapt and adjust to prevent person-to-person contact, which is
believed to be the reason the virus has spread so rapidly on a global
level. 169 The Crittenden court stated, to prevent the spread of the
coronavirus, “[i]ncreased vigilance” by the court is essential. 170
The Crittenden court cited the “increased vigilance” of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia courthouse, the
location for the Crittenden trial. 171 The Middle District adopted a
Standing Order, 172 which temporarily modifies courthouse procedures to
adapt to the global pandemic. 173 The Standing Order allows the
courthouse to remain open while excluding those who are or were exposed
to the virus. 174 The Standing Order then goes further to extend all jury
trials; the extension remains in effect as of the writing of this Comment
in January 2021. 175 A later order out of the Middle District of Georgia
adopted the President of the United States’ Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act (CARES Act), 176 giving each individual judge the
discretion to create courtroom protocols to adapt to the needs of the
courtroom and community. 177 Judge Land, presiding over the case of
Aubrey Crittenden, created and enacted numerous restrictions for his
courtroom, including that “[n]o one will be admitted to the courtroom

167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at *3.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Clay D. Land, Standing Order, IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, https://www.gamd.uscourts.gov/sites/gamd/files/generalordes/Standing%20Order%202020-01%20re%20COVID19%20Operations%20%28003%29.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
173 Id.; Crittenden, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151950, at *4.
174 Id.
175 Crittenden, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151950, at *5; Marc T. Treadwell, Standing
Order Extending Jury Moratorium Because of National Emergency, IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
FOR
THE
MIDDLE
DISTRICT
OF
GEORGIA,
https://www.gamd.uscourts.gov/sites/gamd/files/Standing_Order-202013_Jury_Moratorium.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
176 H.R. 748 (March 27, 2020).
177 Crittenden, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151950, at *9.

Morrison - BP (Do Not Delete)

1282

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

without wearing a mask, and the mask shall remain in place, including
when speaking.” 178
After detailing the new courtroom and courthouse safety procedures,
the court in Crittenden began discussing the specific requirement of
masks in Judge Land’s courtroom. 179 To decide whether witnesses
wearing face masks during criminal trials violates the defendant’s
constitutional right to confrontation, the court first looked to Supreme
Court precedent. 180 The court found that precedent affords the defendant
the right to look at the witness face-to-face, but although this right to
face-to-face confrontation is guaranteed, it is not absolute. 181 The
Crittenden court then applied the Craig test 182 to determine the
constitutionality of masks in criminal trials. 183 The court in Crittenden
reiterated that, under the Craig test, physical, face-to-face confrontation
can be denied: 1) in the furtherance of a necessary public policy; and 2)
where the testimony is otherwise reliable. 184
First, the court in Crittenden emphasized requiring witnesses to wear
masks is a necessary public policy interest. 185 The requirement of masks
“ensur[es] the safety of everyone in the courtroom in the midst of a unique
global pandemic. Without this procedure, everyone in the courtroom
would face the risk of being infected with a lethal virus.” 186 The face
masks are “necessary” because the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) determined that wearing a mask over the nose and
mouth is “strongly recommend[ed]” to avoid infecting others with the
coronavirus. 187 Furthermore, the CDC specifically found masks are more
effective than the face shields and plexiglass screens the Government
suggests be used instead of face masks. 188 To follow the “best available
178 Id. at *10. In addition, “[i]f a Defendant in a criminal proceeding, other than a trial,
refuses to wear a mask, Judge Land will consider having the Defendant taken to the holding
cell outside the courtroom and participate in the proceeding via video.” Id. at *10–*11.
179 Id. at *10.
180 Id. at *13–*22.
181 Id. at *14 (citing Coy, 478 U.S. at 1020).
182 Crittenden, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151950, at *16–*17. The court in Crittenden cited
to United States v. Yates in which the court applied the Craig test in determining violations
of confrontation rights. Id. at *15; 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006).
183 Crittenden, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151950, at *17–*18.
184 Id. at *16–*17 (quoting Craig, 497 U.S. at 850).
185 Id. at *15.
186 Id.
187 Id. (citing Considerations for Wearing Masks, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-facecover-guidance.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2021)).
188 Crittenden, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151950, at *16 (citing Considerations for Wearing
CENTERS
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION,
Masks,
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science in this area” and to ensure the health and safety of all those
attending or participating in the trial, the court in Crittenden determined
the use of face masks is a necessary public policy interest under the Craig
test. 189
Next, under the Craig test, the Crittenden court considered the
reliability of testimony when the witnesses wear face masks. 190 The court
in Crittenden focused on the elements of reliability under the Craig test:
having the physical presence of the witness, placing the witness under
oath, cross-examining the witness, and allowing the trier of fact to
observe the demeanor of the witness. 191 As held in Craig, even if one of
the elements of reliability is interfered with, the other elements, if met,
can preserve the reliability of the testimony. 192 Applying the reliability
elements to the case in Crittenden, the court determined the defendant
will still be able to place all witnesses under oath and cross-examine the
witnesses. 193 The witnesses will still be physically present in the
courtroom. 194 Although the witnesses will be wearing masks, the
defendant and jurors will still be able to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, with the exception of observing the witnesses’ noses and
mouths. 195 The court in Crittenden, however, held the inability to see the
witnesses’ noses and mouths is not essential for reliability because “this
restriction does not diminish the face-to-face nature of the confrontation
contemplated by the Confrontation Clause. 196
To explain its finding that face masks do not interfere with the nature
of face-to-face confrontation, the Crittenden court took the opportunity to
distinguish the facts presented before the court in Crittenden to the facts
in Coy in which impeding the defendant’s view of the witness via the
placement of a large screen did violate the Confrontation Clause. 197 In
Coy, a screen was placed between the defendant and the witness, almost
completely obscuring any view of the witness. 198 When wearing a face
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-coverguidance.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2021)). The Government specifically asked that masks
be removed by witnesses during testimony, or transparent masks or plexiglass screens be
utilized instead of face masks. Id. at *14–*15.
189 Id. at *16.
190 Id. at *17–*18.
191 Id. at *16 (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 846).
192 Id. at *17 (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 851).
193 Id. at *18.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at *18–*19 (citing Coy, 478 U.S. at 1014).
198 Id. (citing Coy, 478 U.S. at 1014).
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mask; however, the Crittenden court found there is only a “tiny piece of
cloth covering” the nose and mouth of the witness; “the masks will in no
way prohibit the Defendant and witnesses from directly looking upon
each other in person . . . .” 199 Inevitably, the jury will not be able to
observe movement of the nose and mouth; however, the Crittenden court
concluded the right to confrontation does not include the ability of the
jury to see “every language of the body.” 200 Although not all facial
expressions will be observable, there are other aspects of body language
which allow for analysis of the witness’s demeanor. 201 Rather:
Demeanor includes the language of the entire body. Here, the jurors
will be able to observe most facets of the witnesses’ demeanor. They
can observe the witnesses from head to toe. They will be able to see
how the witnesses move when they answer a question; how the
witnesses hesitate; how fast the witnesses speak. They will be able to
see the witnesses blink or roll of their eyes, make furtive glances, and
tilt their heads. The Confrontation Clause does not guarantee the right
to see the witness’s lips move or nose sniff . . . . 202

The Crittenden court thereafter found requiring witnesses to wear
face masks while testifying will be both reliable and necessary under
public policy considerations. 203 The mask will not diminish face-to-face
confrontation “in a material way.” 204 Therefore, the court concluded the
witnesses testifying while wearing masks does not infringe on Aubrey
Crittenden’s constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause. 205
IV. ANALYSIS
The United States was undoubtedly unprepared for the novel
coronavirus, which wreaked havoc on every aspect of life in less than two
months. In response to this wildly spreading virus, concern for health
understandably and predictably led to federal and state requirements,
such as limiting the size of gatherings, wearing masks in public places,
diligent handwashing, and closing businesses and government agencies.
It was impossible to predict, however, that the coronavirus’s impact on
the country would lead to serious constitutional questions.

199 Id. at *19.
200 Id.
201 Id. at *20.
202 Id.
203 Id. at *22.
204 Id.
205 Id.
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As the pandemic rages on, the country is beginning to reopen and
adapt to the new-normal. Courts across the nation, in resuming criminal
trials, are now faced with needing to both protect the health of its
occupants as well as ensure any health measures do not offend
defendants’ constitutional rights. Although tempting to do in an
unprecedented global pandemic, courts cannot forget that the
Constitution is the very foundation of the United States, and even the
health interests of its occupants cannot outweigh constitutional
protections. This Analysis will show the court in Crittenden
unconstitutionally permitted the requirement that witnesses testify
while wearing face masks. Hiding the face of a testifying witness violates
the Confrontation Clause, even in light of a global pandemic.
A. Supreme Court Precedent
Although a witness testifying behind a mask during a global
pandemic has never been directly addressed by the Supreme Court, or
even been at issue before the current year, precedent still leads to the
answer that witnesses wearing masks while testifying during criminal
trials violates the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court has
consistently held a defendant has a constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against him. Confusion, however, arises from the seemingly
irreconcilable Supreme Court precedent on whether and when to
dispense with or limit physical, face-to-face confrontation under the
Confrontation Clause.
1. Whether Craig’s Reliability Test Can Still Create
Confrontation Clause Exceptions
Looking to the evolution of Supreme Court precedent regarding
exceptions to the right to face-to-face confrontation, first, the Coy Court
refused to create any exceptions to face-to-face confrontation. 206 The
Court in Coy held, if an exception were to even exist, the exception must
be based on the individual findings of that case and for some necessary
public policy reason. 207 The Craig Court later established a test for
creating exceptions to face-to-face confrontation upon finding the
testimony is still reliable and upon finding there is a necessary public
policy interest that outweighs face-to-face confrontation. 208 Although Coy
and Craig can be reconciled, the Crawford Court recently held against
judges creating discretionary exceptions to the right to face-to-face

206 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.
207 Id.
208 Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.
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confrontation based on reliability. 209 The Crawford Court held that, for
an exception to exist, courts must turn to the Framers' intentions, not to
a judge’s opinion or discretion. 210 Because the Crawford Court broadly
denounced discretionary decisions by judges on the right to
confrontation, particularly in the context of balancing reliability
elements, how could Craig’s reliability test possibly survive? The answer,
although not explicitly expressed by the Supreme Court, is that the Craig
test cannot survive post-Crawford.
Despite the Crawford decision, some courts continue to use the Craig
reliability test to determine whether and when to dispense with face-toface confrontation. 211 In fact, in Crittenden, the court relied on Craig and
only mentioned Crawford in passing as an example of confrontation
rights in the context of hearsay exceptions. 212 The confusion and lack of
discussion of Crawford in addressing face-to-face confrontation questions
are likely due to the fact that the question in Crawford focused on
admission of out-of-court statements, while the Craig Court addressed
the issue of confronting a witness during courtroom testimony in an
untraditional way. However, there is no avoiding the Court in Crawford
made sweeping holdings about the defendant’s right to confrontation.
The Crawford Court expressly held against discretionary decisions by
judges under the Confrontation Clause and in no way limited its holding
to hearsay testimony. Therefore, in considering potential violations to
face-to-face confrontation, courts must turn to the Crawford Court’s
restrictive view to determine whether an exception exists under the
Confrontation Clause.
Because the Craig test is inappropriate in finding Confrontation
Clause exceptions, the court in Crittenden was incorrect in utilizing the
Craig reliability test to determine whether the requirement that
witnesses wear face masks while testifying is constitutional. The
Crawford Court held the right to confrontation is not about reliability,
and the Sixth Amendment does not provide for open-ended exceptions
created by judges. 213 By allowing face masks that directly impair the
ability to see the witness while testifying based on reliability, the court
in Crittenden created the kind of exception the Crawford Court directly
held against.

209 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.
210 Id.
211 See Jesus-Casteneda, 705 F.3d at 1120.
212 Crittenden, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151950, at *21.
213 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54, 62.
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2. Whether Judges Can Consider Public Policy
The holding in Crawford also raises questions about whether judges
can limit a defendant’s confrontation rights based on public policy postCrawford. The Crawford Court clearly opposed judges making
discretionary decisions about a defendant’s confrontation rights but did
so in the context of balancing reliability elements. 214 The Court in
Crawford did not consider whether judges can use public policy to limit
face-to-face confrontation. However, the Crawford Court’s holding
against judge-created exceptions to confrontation rights would suggest
that Crawford also prohibits discretionary exceptions based on public
policy. Nonetheless, this conclusion is not clear as the Crawford Court
did not discuss public policy in its analysis or its holding.
If public policy considerations are permissible in limiting defendants’
face-to-face confrontation rights, what is clear is that, for a court to
restrict face-to-face confrontation based on public policy necessity, the
court would have to do so on a case-by-case basis. The Coy Court rejected
a generalized public policy argument based on presumed trauma. 215 The
Court in Craig did hold in favor of a public policy argument but only upon
very specific findings in the case before the Court. 216 This precedent
makes clear for a court to limit the right to confrontation, the public
policy consideration must be individually considered and decided based
on the case before the court, not based on general presumptions or
general concerns.
Therefore, findings based upon a general public policy concern, such
as public health, is not sufficient to create an exception. The court in
Crittenden improperly analyzed public policy considerations by
generalizing concerns to every witness in the Aubrey Crittenden case.
The Crittenden court should have made a case-by-case decision about
whether the potential risk to each witness outweighs the defendant’s
right to see the witness’s face. During a global pandemic, this public
policy interest may often outweigh the defendant’s right; however,
precedent requires that this decision be made on an individual basis. In
the case of a global pandemic, an individualized decision may require an
inquiry into each witness’s risk for contracting the coronavirus and an
inquiry into each witness’s overall health.

214 Id. at 63.
215 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.
216 Craig, 497 U.S. at 857–58.
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B. Why a Clear Rule Matters
Supreme Court precedent regarding a defendant’s rights to face-toface confrontation has been applied in various jurisdictions, both at the
state and federal levels. Looking specifically to cases where witnesses
partially or wholly hid their faces, a wide range of holdings resulted from
these cases. The Morales court found no Supreme Court test was
appropriate for determining if the disguise violated face-to-face
confrontation, 217 while the other facial disguise courts focused on the
Craig test. 218 The courts in Morales and Jesus-Casteneda found no
violation of the Confrontation Clause, while the courts in Romero and
Sammons did find a constitutional violation. 219 With the application of
the Craig test in the majority of these cases, such variations are not
surprising based on the wide discretion of the judges in these cases.
Applying Craig, there is endless possibility for a court in its discretion to
find numerous possible exceptions to face-to-face confrontation. With no
set rule for what exceptions violate the Confrontation Clause, there is no
predictable outcome for the defendant on his very constitutional rights.
Although there is no Supreme Court precedent that directly addresses
witness face coverings, the applicable test should not be Craig. The test
should be specific, predictable, and strict, so a defendant’s confrontation
right is not dispensed with based on the discretion of one individual. The
right to confront witnesses would not be expressly included in the
Constitution if the right was easily susceptible to the sway of judges.
Therefore, courts for clarity and uniformity should follow the strict
guidelines set by the Crawford Court to ensure a defendant’s
constitutional right to confrontation is not negligently or recklessly
violated.
C. The Importance of a Witness’s Entire Face and The Risk if The Full
Face is Not Exposed
As has been reiterated throughout this Comment, there is a profound
effect when the witness and defendant meet face-to-face in the
courtroom. This meeting is so profound that the very language of the
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant the right to a face-to-face
meeting with his accuser. 220 This right is a literal, express, and explicit
right. How can this right be fulfilled if the witness’s face is half-hidden?

217 Morales, 281 F.3d 58–59.
218 See Jesus-Casteneda, 705 F.3d at 1120; Romero, 136 S.W.3d at 685; Sammons, 478
N.W.2d at 908.
219 Id.
220 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016.
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The answer is clearly that partially or wholly hiding the witness’s face
simply cannot constitute face-to-face confrontation. 221 Face-to-face
confrontation by its very language promises the defendant will see the
witness’s full face.
A witness against the defendant, if worthy of belief, can result in the
defendant potentially losing his life or liberty. Such a high power requires
the witness’s face to be fully exposed. A facial covering simply does not
allow the defendant and trier of fact to truly face the person accusing the
defendant. The accuser is instead hidden. The Crittenden court
downplayed the use of face masks by holding the ability to observe the
nose and mouth of a witness is not crucial to observe a witness’s
demeanor. Yet, how can the witness’s demeanor be observed with a mask
hiding half of all facial expressions? The scrunch of the nose or the twist
of the mouth can enlighten the trier of fact and the defendant to the
authenticity of the testimony. The defendant’s lawyer can react to a
frown to continue with that line of cross-examination. With a mask, the
witness has a way to hide those natural, reactionary facial expressions.
To state the full facial expressions of the witness are not essential for
face-to-face confrontation is both contradictory and unconstitutional.
If masks are permitted in the courtroom, defendants will inevitably
have a more difficult time examining witnesses. If an accuser is
dishonest, it will be easier for the witness to hide behind the mask.
Although the argument can be made a witness can choose to lie with or
without a mask, the Confrontation Clause is necessary because, even
though it does not promise honest testimony, it does protect the
defendant by providing him—and the trier of fact—the opportunity to
assess the honesty of the witness. If all witnesses wear masks while
testifying, the ultimate and terrifying result may be that it will become
easier to convict a defendant purely based on an accuser’s ability to
testify behind the shadow of a mask. The humanity of a person is taken
away when his face is hidden. Without full view of these facial
expressions, it will become easier to just believe the words spoken and
not register and observe that the witness is a person who may be lying.
Even during the age of technology, criminal trials have remained inperson, demonstrating the impact of physical, face-to-face confrontation.
There is a profound effect of requiring the defendant, witnesses,
prosecution, and trier of fact to come into one space, look upon each other,
and play a part in the liberty of the defendant. If everyone can hide
221 In Romero, the witness wearing sunglasses, a baseball hat, and a jacket prohibited
the defendant and finder of fact from judging the demeanor of the witness. 136 S.W.3d at
682. In Sammons, the use of a full-face mask prevented an aspect of personalization that
traditional face-to-face confrontation allows. 478 N.W.2d at 908.
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behind their mask, it may just become easier to take a defendant’s liberty
away.
D. An Appropriate Remedy
To find unconstitutional witnesses wearing face masks while
testifying does not eliminate all remedies and procedures a court can
implement to protect those in the courtroom from contracting the
coronavirus. The Crittenden court held face masks are the best protection
against the coronavirus based on the current findings of the CDC. 222
Naturally, the safest method is often the best method. However, court
adaptations cannot only focus on accommodating the health of everyone
in the courtroom but must also protect the constitutional rights of the
defendant.
Notably, on October 7, 2020, the vice-presidential candidates for the
2020 presidential election held a live debate without masks. The
candidates were placed twelve feet apart and sat behind five-foot
plexiglass screens. 223 Although never held-out to be as safe as face masks,
to see that the use of plexiglass and twelve-foot distance is sufficient to
have leaders of our country debate on the same stage without masks
raises questions as to why it is not sufficient in the courtroom.
The courtroom could even provide protections beyond those at the
debate. The witness could remove the mask while testifying but sit
behind a plexiglass screen while the remainder of the courtroom wear
masks. Determinations could be made before trial as to the risk to a
witness, and the court could provide extra protections to the witness,
such as providing the witness with a clear, transparent mask. 224 As tests
become more available, witnesses could be tested before testifying,
222 See, How to Protect Yourself & Others, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-gettingsick/prevention.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
223 Michael Scherer and Josh Dawsey, Pence team agrees to plexiglass barrier on his
side of debate stage, THE WASHINGTON POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/vpdebate-coronavirus-safety/2020/10/06/ee44fa00-07e7-11eb-a166-dc429b380d10_story.html
(last visited Jan, 10 2021).
224 The court in Crittenden mentioned the use of transparent masks but dismissed the
Government’s suggestion the court substitute cloth masks for plexiglass screens. 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 151950, at *13. The court, however stated, “[n]othing in today's order prevents
any witness or other participant from appearing with a mask that is transparent in the
area of the mouth as long as it is consistent with CDC recommendations.” Id. at n.1. With
this footnote, the court seems to suggest that the use of transparent masks are sufficient.
This may be the best solution for the court in Crittenden to protect the defendant’s
constitutional rights.
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allowing them to remove their masks during testimony. Clearly, there
are other possible procedures to protect the health of the courtroom as
well as the constitutional rights of the defendant. If courts are still not
confident with alternative procedures, the solution may be as simple as
postponing the trial until face masks are no longer recommended by the
CDC. However, no matter what decision is made or what procedure is
selected, the coronavirus should not and cannot preclude constitutional
rights.
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the coronavirus, courts are presented with the difficult
task of ensuring the health of all occupants while maintaining
defendants’ constitutional protections. Changing procedures and
enacting creative and uncommon measures to protect all individuals in
the courtroom cannot be an easy task, and every court should be
applauded for its efforts to reopen and provide for the community.
However, as courts rapidly adapt to the coronavirus, the courts cannot
overlook the Constitution. The text of the Constitution cannot be
disregarded, even during unprecedented times and even when the
requirements of the Constitution come at a high cost. Abiding by the
Constitution often does come at a cost. The cost today is that courts
cannot allow face masks during criminal trials, even during a global
pandemic, without violating the Confrontation Clause.
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